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A B S T R A C T
In this study we analyze the relationship between national cognitive abilities and innovational output
using data from 124 countries of the world. By employing cross-country IQ scores traditionally used by
psychological literature to represent national intelligence, and Economic Complexity Index as a novel
measure of innovation, our study shows that there is a positive connection between them. We use a
variety of tests to check the robustness of the nexus. Overall, our ﬁndings indicate that more intelligent
nations export more sophisticated and diverse products to the world market and thus are more
innovative. Therefore, developing countries should consider investing in human capital and related
institutions if they are to boost innovative capabilities and move up the technology ladder in producing
and exporting sophisticated and varied lines of products. This should bring them greater economic
diversity which could be a right lever in mitigating negative external shocks.
© 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Recently there has been a growing body of development
literature that has pointed out the importance of producing and
exporting sophisticated goods in order to drive future economic
growth (Lall et al., 2006; Hausmann et al., 2007; Hidalgo et al.,
2007; Jarreau and Poncet, 2012; Berg et al., 2012). This strand of
research has ﬁrmly established that it does not matter how much
countries export, but what they export is more important for their
growth and prosperity (Hausmann et al., 2007; Lederman and
Maloney, 2012). Indeed, some products have greater complexity in
a way that they are associated with higher productivity and those
countries that lean on manufacturing and exporting such products
will eventually perform better than others.
It is no invention that producing and exporting sophisticated
goods certainly requires adequate level of human capital that spurs
innovation. It is this capital, based on which innovation leads to
greater productivity, competitiveness, and economic growth
(Mincer, 1984; Barro, 2001). For example, Lynn and Vanhanen
(2012) summarize 11 studies where national intelligence, a reliable
indicator of human capital (Jones and Schneider, 2006), is treated
as an important antecedent of various innovation metrics such as
academic publications, patents, technology exports, Nobel Prize
awards in literature, science and peace, etc. From among these
cognitive outputs the correlation of IQ turns out to be high enough
especially with academic publications (0.87), STEM, a measure of
excellence in science and technology (0.74), and so called
“intellectual autonomy”, which refers to the independence of
thought (Gelade, 2008, p. 717) (0.61). In line with these ﬁndings,
there is a reason to believe that human capital is “a key
requirement for the establishment and maintenance of effective
institutions . . . [and] the ultimate requirement for innovation,
efﬁcient use of resources, and economic growth” (Meisenberg and
Lynn, 2011, p. 421).
Indeed, as micro level research suggests cognitively able
individuals show better performance in undertaking complex
tasks and duties. “More intelligent persons can better cope with
difﬁcult cognitive demands, they make fewer errors, they are more
innovative and generally more productive” (Rindermann, 2012, p.
110). This may then translate into a production of more diversiﬁed
and sophisticated exports.
After all, extant literature suggests that intelligence brings
about innovation through various channels.
First, innovation, the act of introducing a novel product (service)
to the market (Acs and Audretsch, 1988), is often a result of a
process whose success relies on both formal and informal
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interactions and exchanges of knowledge (knowledge spillover)
among various economic agents (Doh and Acs, 2010). In light of
this it can be claimed that social capital is an important causal
element of innovation. For example, by analyzing the survey data
administered to 440 manufacturing ﬁrms in one of the regions of
Canada, Landry et al. (2002) show how diverse forms of social
capital contribute to the increase of innovation within ﬁrms, and
certain types of it (e.g. research networks) even determine the
radicalness of innovation. A study by Doh and Acs (2010) supports
the necessity of building strong social interrelationships in today’s
knowledge- and network-based economy. Indeed, the importance
of social capital in inducing innovation can at least be character-
ized by lowered transaction costs (information costs, coordination
costs, contract and law enforcement costs etc.) among ﬁrms and
between them and other economic agents (Maskell, 2000). From
this stance it can be argued that there is a higher intensity of
innovation in countries with more intelligent populations who are
more willing to collaborate in favor of long-term rewards
(Shamosh and Gray, 2008; Salahodjaev, 2015).
Second, a slightly different approach could be the so called O-
ring theory. Initially suggested by Kremer (1993), the theory states
that positive assortative matching, according to which individual
laborers (in our case scientists and other types of innovators) with
similar levels of skills tend to team up with each other, brings about
per capita productivity increases in countries. This channel can be
best explained by examples. Firms with the most advanced
technology are better off hiring highly skilled workers, but those
employing an average class of technology should hire appropri-
ately skilled laborers, not highly skilled ones. By the same token, in
different areas it is more productive if high IQ agents interact with
each other, and low IQ individuals would gain more if they
cooperate with more experienced individuals of comparable IQ
level. According to the O-ring theory, this type of same IQ level
clustering increases collective intelligence and leads to greater
productivity. In a cross-country scale, the O-ring theory explains
why those countries that have small differences in IQ levels may
have signiﬁcantly higher differences in income: it is a collective
impact of individual country’s IQ level (because of positive
assortative matching or clustering) that creates its productivity
level (Jones, 2011, 2013). This is why the effect of IQ on overall
productivity is higher across countries than across individuals
(Burhan et al., 2015). Therefore, the O-ring theory should be
regarded as an important channel through which intelligence
inﬂuences innovation.
Third, another strand of literature assert that it is not mean
intelligence, but the IQ level of the so called smart fractions –
intellectual classes with the highest abilities in a country (e.g. top
1% or 5%)  that push ahead with innovation (e.g. see Coyle et al.,
2016; Rindermann, 2012). For instance, using a cross-national data
on more than 110 countries, Gelade (2008) pinpoints these
cognitive elites with IQ levels greater than 140 as a primary
driver of patent rates and GDP. They afﬁrm that in those countries
with a greater proportion of smart fractions more technological
knowledge circulates and more innovation takes place than in
other countries (Gelade, 2008, p. 711). This sort of literature further
regards the abilities of smart fractions as “more important for
country differences in wealth, nations’ intellectual excellence and
political attributes of societies than the average ability or the
ability level of a non-smart fraction” (Rindermann et al., 2009, p.
20) because “highly able intellectual classes are necessary to
manage growing complexity in technology, economy and everyday
life” (Rindermann, 2012, p. 111).
Combining all three channels, we hereby argue that intellectual
classes include not only smart individuals on their own (smart
fractions theory), but their clusters around ﬁrms (O-ring theory)
where they rely on social interactions (social capital channel) to
innovate and be more productive. Since literature suggests that the
probability of exporting is high among productive ﬁrms and those
that are not productive usually work for the domestic market
(Wagner, 2007; Pertl and o Polanec, 2007), the suggested
theoretical blend can readily be justiﬁed by the empirical ﬁnding
that positive link between ﬁrm productivity and exports is
attributed to the ﬁrm’s innovation decisions (Cassiman et al.,
2010).
Whilst a recent study by Squalli and Wilson (2014) has ﬁrst
provided a test of the intelligence-innovation hypothesis using
data on US states, our contribution in this paper is to investigate
how persistent the hypothesis is in a cross-country scale based on
the above discussed theoretical channels. We use different sets of
variables and employ a variety of statistical methods to check the
robustness of our results. The intelligence-innovation nexus is
tested on a sample of 124 nations. The Economic Complexity Index
is used as a measure of innovation since it represents materialized
innovations and is a better measure of innovation given some
problems inherent to traditional proxies of innovation such as
patents rate and R&D expenditure (e.g. see Sweet and Maggio,
2015; for a detailed discussion). After controlling for endogeneity
our ﬁndings show that one standard deviation unit increase in
national IQ scores is associated with a 0.069 standard deviation
units increase in the economic complexity, ceteris paribus.
The paper proceeds in the following way: Section 2 is on data
and methodological issues; Section 3 provides econometric
results. Robustness tests of ﬁndings are presented in Section 4;
and Section 5 concludes.
2. Econometric model and data
2.1. The model
To get the quantitative impact of IQ on innovation, we estimate
the following regression model:
ECIi ¼ bo þ b1IQi þ bxCVi þ ei ð1Þ
where the dependent variable is Economic Complexity Index, ECI;
IQ is an average national intelligence; and CV is a vector of control
variables.
2.2. Data
2.2.1. Dependent variable
The Economic Complexity Index (ECI) ranks countries of the
world according to the level of diversiﬁcation and complexity of
their export baskets. The idea is that the state of production of
goods reﬂects the existing productive knowledge in a society. It is
based on the realistic assumption that those countries that export
more complex as well as a larger number of different goods are
typically more economically developed and have higher potential
for future growth. As such, the index features two dimensions of
goods produced and exported:
a) The state of complexity: goods produced within chemical and
machinery industries can be attributed to complex products
whereas those that are raw and purely agricultural are
considered to be less complex products.
b) The state of diversiﬁcation: the number of goods the country
can produce (how diversiﬁed the export is) and export reﬁned
by the number of countries able to make those goods (how
ubiquitous the export is) can represent the level of diversiﬁca-
tion of the country.
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In sum, the ECI portrays how complex and diversiﬁed the
country’s export basket is. It can be a good proxy for the level of
productive knowledge, i.e. innovation in a country.
However, due to the nature of the index which is based on UN
COMTRADE database, one of its possible drawbacks is that it
represents innovation across only goods exported whereas it may
be a case that certain countries specialize in exports of innovative
services. Another downside of the index rests upon the fact that it
doesn’t include information on non-tradable products that may be
intrinsically innovative and representative of ‘internal’ productive
knowledge. I.e. certain complex goods may be produced and
consumed domestically which can’t be observed through trade
data. Despite these disadvantages, the ECI is a novel measure and
well correlated with traditional metrics of innovation as might be
observed from Fig. 1 and Table 1.
The index includes data for 124 economies for 1995–2014 and
comes from the Atlas of Economic Complexity, a Harvard-MIT joint
research project. The data ranges between 2.5 and 2.5. The higher
the index is, the more complex products the country produces and
exports.
For the purposes of present research we take the average value
of the ECI for 2010–2014.
2.2.2. Independent variable
The independent variable of our interest is a cross-national
measure of IQ, intelligence. It is taken from Lynn (2012) (missing
data is further updated from Lynn and Vanhanen, 2012) and
represents average IQ scores for 190 nations of the world. These IQ
scores are collected from a variety of sources that reﬂect the
outcomes of different IQ tests carried out in many countries of the
world. They are scaled so that their mean value is 100 and standard
deviation equals to 15, with the mean based on the IQ level of the
United Kingdom. National IQ data ranges between 61.2 (Niger) and
106.9 (Singapore).
We hypothesize that the measure of intelligence is positively
associated with the dependent variable because more intelligent
nations possess more productive knowledge and hence are more
innovative.
Indeed, Fig. 2 graphically proves our hypothesis. The correlation
coefﬁcient between ECI and intelligence is equal to 0.76 (see
Table 2). Countries with higher IQ and higher ECI mainly include
some East Asian countries such as Japan, South Korea, and
Singapore as well as some European countries such as Germany,
Switzerland, Czech Republic, and Finland.
2.2.3. Control variables
The literature review shows that a number of control variables
should be included into the model as antecedents of innovation.
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Fig. 1. ECI and traditional measures of innovation (a–d).
Source: author’s calcualtions based on WDI and the Atlas of Economic Complexity data.
Table 1
Correlation matrix of ECI and traditional measures of innovation.
eci r&d researchers (log) patents (log) ht exports
eci 1
r&d 0.77 1
researchers (log) 0.74 0.91 1
patents (log) 0.59 0.61 0.49 1
ht exports 0.47 0.40 0.43 0.38 1
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We use average years of schooling to proxy for education as the
latter may have an independent effect on innovation beyond what
intelligence might exhibit.
Research and development activities are also considered to be a
widely used contributor to innovation (e.g. see Landry et al., 2002;
Doh and Acs, 2010; Squalli and Wilson, 2014).
To capture the level of economic development of countries we
use GDP per capita in PPP terms (in logarithm).
We further incorporate a population density variable deﬁned as
a percentage of population per 1 sq. km of area to capture the
effects of spatial clustering and agglomeration on the ﬂow of ideas
that bring about innovation (Carlino et al., 2007). It is essentially a
representative of knowledge spillovers within countries (Squalli
and Wilson, 2014).
We include trade openness measure into the model as openness
to the outside world may be associated with greater innovation
due to productivity increase and technological spillover effects
throughout domestic economies because of greater market
competition (e.g. see Xu and Chiang, 2005; Coyle et al., 2016).
Foreign direct investment can also be an important channel
through which transfers of new technologies and related
technological diffusion may take place and result in the production
of more complex export products (e.g. see Xu and Wang, 2000;
Cheung and Ping, 2004).
Lastly, the democracy (the average of civil liberties and political
rights indicators) variable by Freedom House is also in our model to
control for the institutional quality of the political system present
in individual countries of the world. A number of studies indicate
that institutional setting, or in more speciﬁc terms, “social
technologies” provide low transaction cost ways of getting
something done” (Nelson and Nelson, 2002, p. 268) and thus a
strong predictor of innovative capacity. Indeed, innovation is
sometimes associated with risk and uncertainty which raise
transaction costs. Innovative capabilities ﬂourish in those open
societies where those costs are low enough and institutions play an
important role in this regard (Van Waarden, 2001; Coyle et al.,
2016).
We expect the coefﬁcient estimates for all right-hand side
variables to be positive and that for democracy to be negative as to
the nature of construction of the variable (i.e. the lower values of
the democracy index stands for the higher levels of democracy).
All control variables are average values for 2010–2014.
Descriptive statistics of variables are presented in Table 2. Table 3
is a correlation matrix.
3. Empirical results
Stepwise regression results by using standard OLS method are
presented in Table 4. One-to-one regression of ECI on IQ renders a
positive and statistically signiﬁcant coefﬁcient estimate. The
variance in intelligence quotient explains 60% of the variance in
economic complexity in the restricted model.
Statistically, the inclusion of the education variable seems
equally important in explaining variations in innovation. However,
controlling for further macro-institutional factors turns the
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Fig. 2. ECI and intelligence.
Source: The Atlas of Economic Complexity, Lynn (2012) and Lynn and Vanhanen
(2012).
Table 2
Descriptive statistics.
Variable Source Obs. Mean Std.dev. Min Max
ECI The Atlas of Economic Complexity 124 0.05 1.02 1.99 2.27
IQ Lynn (2012) and
Lynn and Vanhanen (2012)
190 84.19 10.81 61.2 106.9
Education UNDP Human Development Reports 186 7.88 3.06 1.3 12.9
R&D WDI, World Bank 110 0.92 0.96 0.01 4.13
GDP per capita (log) WDI 192 9.16 1.23 6.47 11.79
Density (log) Author’s calculations based on WDI 213 4.39 1.57 1.98 9.83
Trade openness WDI 185 95.08 53.22 24.36 444.9
FDI stock p/c (log) UNCTAD 195 7.70 2.19 0.53 16.39
Democracy Freedom House 193 3.33 1.96 1 7
Table 3
Correlation matrix.
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX
ECI 1.00
IQ 0.76 1.00
Education 0.66 0.73 1.00
R&D 0.75 0.63 0.56 1.00
GDP per capita (log) 0.62 0.69 0.74 0.52 1.00
Density (log) 0.33 0.13 0.02 0.18 0.06 1.00
Trade openness 0.30 0.32 0.24 0.08 0.29 0.30 1.00
FDI stock p/c (log) 0.62 0.68 0.73 0.53 0.86 0.00 0.46 1.00
Democracy 0.52 0.40 0.52 0.48 0.36 0.05 0.04 0.54 1.00
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coefﬁcient of the education variable insigniﬁcant. Nevertheless, we
still keep the latter in further steps as it is theoretically relevant to
the model.
In the meantime, the R&D expenditures variable moderates the
effect of intelligence on ECI, but doesn’t change its signiﬁcance
(column 3). The model reveals that both intelligence and R&D
variables are statistically important variables.
Although the introduction of economic variables such as GDP
per capita, trade openness, and FDI stock per capita as well as the
density variable are necessitated by the theory, empirically
estimated individual coefﬁcients of these variables, except for
the density variable, happen to be statistically not signiﬁcant even
at 10% level.
Column 5 shows that when we include the democracy variable
into the regression it is pertinent to the context: its coefﬁcient is
individually statistically signiﬁcant at 5% and it further contributes
to the explanatory power of the model (adjusted coefﬁcient of
determination goes up from 0.73 to 0.75).
Up to this point the coefﬁcient estimate of R&D variable has
remained its signiﬁcance at 1% level. In the meantime, one should
note that the variable of our interest, national intelligence,
consistently keeps its statistical signiﬁcance at 1% level. Testing
the model as speciﬁed in column 5 for the omitted variable bias
(Ramsey’s RESET test) shows that it does not suffer from this
problem (p = 0.23).
After all, in an OLS setting, one standard deviation unit increase
in national IQ scores would be associated with 0.03 standard
deviation units increase in ECI, ceteris paribus.
The coefﬁcients of independent variables across all speciﬁca-
tions match our a priori expectations given that they are
statistically signiﬁcant. For instance, those countries where
political rights and civil liberties (democracy) are relatively in
good shape experience a higher level of innovative activities which
translate into the production of more sophisticated export goods.
In the meantime, major criticism of our results may be the
endogeneity problem. One possibility is that intelligence and
innovation may be correlated with a third variable(s) which may be
unobserved and thus not included into the model. Measurement
errors in variables are another likely reason why we should apply a
different econometric estimation method. The ignorance of the
endogeneity problem in our context may result in biased and
inconsistent OLS estimates (see e.g. Gujarati, 2014).
To solve the mentioned problem it is conventional to apply an
instrumental variable (IV) approach. Following León (2015, 2016),
Salahodjaev and Azam (2015) and Kanyama (2014) we use two
different instruments that are individually related to intelligence,
but are unrelated to ECI. They are absolute latitude of the
geographical location of each country, and ultraviolet (UV)
exposure of population.
The use of these instruments is justiﬁed by the relevant
literature. León and León (2014, 2015) have recently proposed a
new theory where IQ gains of recent generations of populations are
the result of the following chain of effects: absolute latitude ! UVB
Table 5
ECI and intelligence: IV regression results.
Stage: (1) (2)
Dep. variable: IV –
1st stage
IQ
IV –
2nd stage
ECI
IV –
1st stage
IQ
IV –
2nd stage
ECI
IQ 0.069** 0.069***
(0.030) (0.026)
Education 0.677* 0.018 0.305 0.017
(0.371) (0.050) (0.401) (0.047)
R&D 2.207** 0.207* 2.114** 0.208**
(0.902) (0.107) (0.839) (0.099)
GDP p/c (log) 2.237 0.076 2.842** 0.077
(1.409) (0.104) (1.367) (0.101)
Density (log) 0.716 0.130* 0.632 0.130*
(0.651) (0.073) (0.613) (0.073)
Trade openness 0.025 0.001 0.024 0.001
(0.017) (0.002) (0.016) (0.002)
FDI stock p/c (log) 0.127 0.086 0.363 0.085
(0.793) (0.074) (0.776) (0.074)
Democracy 0.033 0.113*** 0.064 0.113***
(0.607) (0.044) (0.586) (0.043)
Absolute latitude 0.173***
(0.046)
UV damage 0.049***
(0.012)
Constant 49.43*** 6.358*** 63.24*** 6.331***
(9.522) (1.636) (9.566) (1.463)
N 87 87 87 87
adj. R2 0.675 0.718 0.706 0.720
1st stage F-stat 35.21 – 39.82 –
(p-value) (0.00) (0.00)
Wooldridge’s
robust score
(p-value)
– 2.07
(0.15)
– 3.46
(0.07)
Heteroskedasticity adjusted robust standard errors in parentheses.
* p < 0.10.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
Table 4
ECI and intelligence: OLS results.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
IQ 0.078*** 0.054*** 0.040*** 0.030*** 0.031***
(0.006) (0.008) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
Education 0.123*** 0.042 0.058 0.033
(0.031) (0.031) (0.037) (0.039)
R&D 0.388*** 0.349*** 0.312***
(0.072) (0.077) (0.073)
GDP p/c (log) 0.009 0.146
(0.096) (0.090)
Density (log) 0.144** 0.139**
(0.059) (0.061)
Trade openness 0.000 0.002
(0.001) (0.001)
FDI stock p/c (log) 0.037 0.078
(0.071) (0.070)
Democracy 0.108**
(0.044)
Constant 6.858*** 5.791*** 4.081*** 4.327*** 4.401***
(0.496) (0.540) (0.688) (0.712) (0.683)
N 124 124 90 88 87
adj. R2 0.604 0.654 0.690 0.727 0.747
Dependent variable: Economic Complexity Index.
Heteroskedasticity adjusted robust standard errors in parentheses.
*p < 0.10.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
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radiation ! vitamin D3! parents’ sexual hormones ! family size
! child’s intellectual environment ! IQ. By analyzing Peruvian
children’s math and reading abilities they conclude that intelli-
gence increases with absolute latitude (León and León, 2014).
Besides, Rindermann et al. (2015) show that absolute latitude has
highest correlations with cognitive ability mean, and in the same
country sample  with cognitive ability, top ability level and
innovation. Further, by analyzing the impact of altitude above sea
level on intelligence, León and Avilés (2016) note that “UV
radiation, which is stronger at high altitude, is theorized to
negatively affect intelligence”.
By using data on absolute latitude and UV exposure from Ashraf
and Galor (2013) as instruments, the regression results show that
the coefﬁcients of national intelligence are statistically signiﬁcant
across all speciﬁcations indicating the robustness of results
(Table 5). This can be veriﬁed through the adjusted coefﬁcient
of determination (R2) of the model which is equal to 72%, and ﬁrst
stage F-statistic which is greater than 35% and statistically
signiﬁcant. Wooldridge’s robust score test of overidentifying
restrictions indicates that we fail to reject the null of valid
instruments at the same signiﬁcance level (p = 0.15; 0.07). So, the
variables are exogenous and the model is speciﬁed correctly.
One should note that our ﬁndings from IV regressions
empirically, but indirectly support the UV Radiation Theory of
Intelligence proposed by León, (2015, 2016), León and León (2014,
2015).
4. Robustness checks
In this paper we also try to check the robustness of our results in
several ways.
First, we re-estimate the initial model with a quantile (QREG)
and robust regression (RREG) options (Table 6). The QREG
approach addresses the dissimilarity of nations, i.e. intelligence
may have differential inﬂuence on countries with different levels
of the ECI. This method generates more efﬁcient coefﬁcient
estimates especially when OLS residuals are not normally
distributed (Buchinsky, 1998). On the other hand, the robust
regression option is usually used to control for heteroskedasticity
and inﬂuential observations (outliers). The results of implement-
ing both techniques clearly exhibit that the coefﬁcients of national
IQ scores remain intact at the 1% signiﬁcance level and range
between 0.031 and 0.038.
Second, we re-estimate our model with an alternative set of
control variables. We keep IQ and GDP per capita variables in the
model and further extend the dataset to include the number of
researchers in R&D (per million people) and mean tariff rates from
World Bank’s World Development Indicators, intellectual property
rights protection data from Park (2008), and information on
British, French, Scandinavian and Socialist legal origins (German
legal origin is a reference group) from La Porta et al., (1999).
Relevant literature states that all of these variables theoretically
belong to the model (see e.g. Qiu and Lai, 2004; Furukawa, 2010;
Table 6
ECI and intelligence: quantile and robust regression results.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Q 0.2 Q 0.4 Q 0.5 Q 0.6 Q 0.8 RREG
IQ 0.032* 0.035** 0.035*** 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.038***
(0.017) (0.016) (0.013) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Education 0.021 0.019 0.042 0.033 0.084*** 0.028
(0.053) (0.061) (0.047) (0.028) (0.032) (0.033)
R&D 0.372*** 0.401*** 0.360*** 0.321*** 0.260*** 0.311***
(0.125) (0.140) (0.099) (0.060) (0.077) (0.068)
GDP p/c (log) 0.029 0.132 0.026 0.160 0.182 0.119
(0.193) (0.237) (0.176) (0.097) (0.114) (0.119)
Density (log) 0.057 0.053 0.143** 0.170*** 0.123** 0.083*
(0.081) (0.083) (0.062) (0.035) (0.047) (0.042)
Trade openness 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003** 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
FDI stock p/c (log) 0.008 0.085 0.009 0.036 0.091 0.073
(0.140) (0.173) (0.120) (0.073) (0.093) (0.084)
Democracy 0.043 0.093 0.098* 0.108*** 0.072 0.111***
(0.056) (0.074) (0.054) (0.036) (0.044) (0.040)
Constant 3.957*** 4.148*** 4.144*** 4.701*** 4.773*** 4.406***
(1.492) (1.561) (1.153) (0.690) (0.752) (0.763)
N 87 87 87 87 87 87
adj. R2 0.768
Dependent variable: Economic Complexity Index. Columns 1-5 exhibit the outcomes of quantile regression across different quantiles, column 6 displays the results of RREG
approach.
Standard errors in parentheses. In column 6 heteroskedasticity adjusted robust standard errors in parentheses.
* p < 0.10.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
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Qian, 2007). The results demonstrate that national intelligence is
indeed quite robust to a different setting of the same issue
(Table 7). In particular, national intelligence, IPR protection
variables, and dummies for different legal origins display statistical
signiﬁcance and have expected signs (column 5). It turns out that
all types of legal origins are associated with less innovation than
German legal origin. Indeed, Germany and other countries with
German-type legal origins have high rankings in ECI.
Third, in Table 8 we regress other traditional metrics of
innovation that are described in Fig. 1 on the initial set of
explanatory variables. All of the regressions conﬁrm our earlier
ﬁndings: intelligence is an important antecedent of innovation.
Fourth, Tobler’s First Law of Geography states that “All places are
related but nearby places are more related than distant places”.
Using cross-country IQ data to explain the health care expenditure
of nations, Lv and Xu (2016) have shown that controlling for spatial
dependence may be of high importance when neighboring
countries share similar or close socio-economic characteristics
with each other than non-neighboring ones. Indeed, when sample
data has a locational component it is likely that spatial dependence
may exist between the observations and/or spatial heterogeneity
occurs in the relationships (Ward and Gleditsch, 2008). In line with
these considerations, as a further check for robustness we employ
spatial econometric techniques to see whether they make sense in
exploring the relationship between ECI and cross-country
intelligence. We consider geographical locations of countries as
represented by their respective latitude and longitude values to
construct the spatial weight (W) matrix. Results presented in
Table 9 suggest that indeed spatial dependence is relevant to our
model. Outcome indicator of spatial lag model rejects the null
hypothesis of no spatial dependence in the data. One should note
that the coefﬁcient of intelligence in spatial lag model still keeps its
sign and statistical signiﬁcance.1
5. Conclusion
In this study we attempt to analyze the relationship between
national intelligence and innovation using data from 124 countries
of the world over the period from 2010 to 2014. The results indicate
that there is a robustly positive association between intelligence
and innovation. We can also conclude that more intelligent nations
export more sophisticated and diverse products to the world
market. This suggests that developing countries should consider
investing in human capital and related institutions if they are to
boost innovative capabilities and move up the technology ladder in
producing and exporting sophisticated products. This should bring
them greater economic diversity which could be a right lever in
mitigating negative external shocks.
In the meantime, we admit that our study has its shortcomings.
Due to cross-sectional structure of the intelligence data, we
Table 7
ECI and intelligence: OLS regressions with alternative set of control variables.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
IQ 0.052*** 0.054*** 0.041*** 0.039*** 0.027**
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012)
Education 0.109*** 0.038 0.002 0.009 0.072
(0.031) (0.029) (0.034) (0.039) (0.050)
GDP p/c (log) 0.071 0.012 0.016 0.010 0.202
(0.070) (0.062) (0.103) (0.111) (0.142)
Researchers (log) 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
IPR protection 0.437*** 0.385*** 0.470***
(0.104) (0.119) (0.134)
Tariff rates 0.020 0.015
(0.013) (0.015)
British legal origin 0.746***
(0.159)
French legal origin 0.957***
(0.172)
Scandinavian legal
origin
0.746***
(0.265)
Socialist legal origin 0.471**
(0.204)
Constant 6.143*** 5.191*** 5.256*** 4.647*** 4.371***
(0.570) (0.506) (0.524) (0.662) (0.731)
N 122 84 70 66 64
adj. R2 0.656 0.761 0.800 0.799 0.845
Dependent variable: Economic Complexity Index.
Heteroskedasticity adjusted robust standard errors in parentheses.
*p < 0.10.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
Table 8
ECI and intelligence: regressions with alternative dependent variables.
R&D Researchers Patents HT exports
IQ 0.043*** 0.081*** 0.177*** 0.462***
(0.012) (0.017) (0.047) (0.105)
Education 0.023 0.075 0.080 0.575
(0.045) (0.049) (0.138) (0.431)
R&D – 0.503*** 1.098*** 2.505**
(0.088) (0.305) (1.024)
GDP p/c (log) 0.093 0.134 0.726 4.299**
(0.122) (0.159) (0.547) (1.728)
Density (log) 0.075 0.113* 0.047 0.613
(0.069) (0.068) (0.185) (0.675)
Trade openness 0.002 0.000 0.013** 0.010
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.026)
FDI stock p/c (log) 0.027 0.074 0.572** 3.194**
(0.092) (0.112) (0.263) (1.282)
Democracy 0.151*** 0.023 0.312* 1.006
(0.039) (0.080) (0.178) (0.801)
Constant 3.446*** 3.239** 14.252*** 18.911**
(0.870) (1.359) (4.773) (8.565)
N 104 89 88 99
adj. R2 0.450 0.842 0.557 0.363
Dependent variables: R&D  research and development expenditure as% of GDP;
Researchers  number of researchers in R&D per million people (in logarithm);
Patents  number of patents ﬁled by residents (in logarithm); HT exports  high-
tech exports as% of manufactured exports.
Heteroskedasticity adjusted robust standard errors in parentheses.
* p < 0.10.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
1 We have also tried to enlarge the dimensions of W matrix to 118x118 by
dropping the R&D variable from the model which has many missing values. The
signs and signiﬁcance levels of intelligence and other independent variables still
remain intact.
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couldn’t make use of more sophisticated econometric methods in
our analysis, nor have we been able to shed light on dynamic
relationship between intelligence and innovation. What’s more,
ECI variable that we use in this paper doesn’t take into account the
global value chains phenomenon and its characteristics. Also, it
doesn’t cover exports of (sophisticated) services, an important
element of global trade. In spite of these limitations, we reckon that
we have been able to effectively blend theoretical channels
through which intelligence is associated with innovation to explain
how exactly the link works. Moreover, spatial characteristics of the
intelligence-innovation nexus are explored in the paper by
employing spatial econometric techniques, a promising methodo-
logical construct of recent decades that is indispensable if one
deals with geographical data such as ours. Besides that, a number
of alternative research methods are exercised to authenticate the
robustness of the relationship.
With regard to the future directions of research on the topic, we
suggest that above-mentioned limitations should be properly
addressed. Some interactions between intelligence and different
antecedents of innovation could be tested. Alternative measures of
cognitive abilities should be employed to see how they translate
into innovative products and decisions during various business
cycles. Survey level studies on the issue would give a ﬂexibility to
analyze different dimensions of innovative behavior (e.g. among
migrants) and thus can also be a promising avenue for future
research.
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